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THE RIGHT TO INVESTIGATE AND NEW YORK'S
"STOP AND FRISK" LAW
JOHN A. RONAYNAE*

I. INTRODUCTION
HE power and duty of the police to investigate crime has never been
seriously questioned. However, the distinction between investigation
and arrest, or the point at which an investigation ends and an arrest takes
place, has never been adequately defined, particularly by the courts of
New York. The possibility that an investigation was in progress, rather
than an arrest, has been overlooked in most criminal cases involving the
question of the existence of probable cause for an arrest.'
The New York State legislature amended the Code of Criminal
Procedure in 1964 to include a new section entitled "Temporary questioning of persons in public places; search for weapons," which authorizes
the stopping and questioning of persons whom the police reasonably
suspect of the commission of crime. The statute, which became effective
on July 1, 1964, states:

T

1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or any of the
crimes specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand
of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section
and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such peron
for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or any other thing
the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the
completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully
2
possessed or arrest such person.

* Administrafive Asstant to the Dean, Fordham University School of Law; member
of the New York Bar.
1. The dearth of authority in point is undoubtedly due to the long-standing rule of
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 NE. 5S5 (1926), which admitted evidence even
though illegally seized. Prior to the imposition of the exclusionary rule of BMapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), there was little point in discussing whether there was probable cause
for an arrest prior to the search which disclosed the evidence, since the evidence seized
could be used to justify the arrest. For this reason, the present effect of pre-Alapp decisions
may be questioned. In any event, few defendants challenged the right of a police officer
to stop and talk to them on the public streets. The question usually arose as an issue
in the defense of a charge of assault for resisting an illeal arrest. People v. Cherry, 307
N.Y. 30S, 121 N.E.2d 233 (1954); People v. Dreares, 15 App. Div. 2d 204, 221 N.Y.S.2d
319 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd mem. 11 N.Y.2d 906, 132 N.E.2d 312, 22S N.Y.S.2d 467 (1962).
However the question of investigation versus arrest was not fully considered in these cases,
but rather the issue turned on whether there was probable cause for arrest at the instant
of stopping.
2. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § ISO-a.
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This enactment is substantially similar to two subsections of the Uniform Arrest Act, prepared by the Interstate Commission on Crime in
1939.? It was submitted to the legislature by the Mayor's legislative
representative at the request of the Police Department of the City of
New York.4 The original proposal included four subsections of the
Uniform Arrest Act, including subsections 2 and 3 of section 2 of the
original act, authorizing further detention up to a period of two hours
if the person questioned fails to identify himself or explain his actions.
However, the bill introduced and passed in the Assembly5 and Senate0
omitted these subdivisions.
The right of the police to temporarily detain a person during an investigation will be squarely presented in the interpretation of the new statute.
The need for clarifying legislation was made necessary by the conflict in
case law. Unfortunately, it is more than a simple conflict. Basically, the
problem is an avoidance of the issue of whether there was an arrest or
whether the process of investigation was still under way. Although there
are no clear-cut classifications, there are two general schools of thought
exemplified in case law. The first ignores the question of investigation and,
in effect, holds that it is the operation of the defendant's mind which
determines whether there was an arrest. As soon as the defendant feels
that his liberty is constrained, there is an arrest. 7 Some courts then go
to great lengths to find probable cause existing at that instant to justify
the arrest.8 At other times, however, courts have held that no probable
cause existed and, in similar circumstances, the arrest was illegal because
the officer did not have enough evidence for conviction at the instant of
the arrest
The other school of thought holds that the statutory definition of an
arrest must be made out before there can be an arrest. That is, the person
must be taken into custody that he may be held to answer for a crime."0
This school recognizes the possibility of a period of investigation and
indicates that it is the operation of the arresting officer's mind which
determines whether there was a temporary detention or an arrest and
3. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 343-47 (1942).
4. Ruggieri, Memorandum in Support of '64 Police #1, Office of the Mayor, City of
New York.
5. Ass. Intro. No. 1859, Pr. No. 1860, N.Y. State Leg. 187th Sess. (1964).
6. Sen. Intro. No. 1207, Pr. No. 1214, N.Y. State Leg. 187th Sess. (1964).
7. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Limbeck v. Gerry, 15 Misc. 663, 668,
39 N.Y. Supp. 95, 97 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
8. People v. Foster, 10 N.Y.2d 99, 176 N.E.2d 397, 217 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1961); People
v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y. Supp. 326 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1922).
9. People v. Moore, 11 N.Y.2d 271, 183 N.E.2d 225, 228 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1962).
10. People v. Marendi, 213 N.Y. 600, 608, 107 N.E. 1058, 1060 (1915); Hook v. New
York, 15 Misc. 2d 672, 181 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (memorandum decision).
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the precise moment of the arrest. Of course, this school requires that the
facts and circumstances justify the inner operation of the officer's mind
to find11probable cause for both the detention and the arrest if it should
follow.
These rulings represent a wavering attempt to strike some balance
between the public interest in the prevention of crime and the speedy
apprehension of criminals, and the right of the individual to his personal
freedom from undue interference by law-enforcement agencies. Decisions
on the law of arrest, particularly when they allow obviously guilty persons
to escape justice, have been the subject of vigorous criticism." The
enactment by the legislature of the "stop and frisk" law has resulted in
criticism by bar associations and by civil rights
equally vigorous
13
organizations.
The use of the word "suspects" in the statute has caused considerable
alarm to the opponents of the new law. The fact that the statute uses
the words "reasonablysuspects" has not deterred them from reaching the
conclusion that the law is unconstitutional as authorizing a general
search or stopping and searching upon mere suspicion. If the new statute
permitted a "general search" or stopping, or questioning and searching on
"mere suspicion" or "pure rumor," it is quite probable that it would be
unconstitutional.' However, many experts have decided that this law
is unconstitutional without e.xamining recent case law as well as common
law precedents. Such a decision may be unduly hasty.

II.

COMMON LAW RIGHT OF INVESTIGATION

The law of arrest as it is known today can be traced to the English
common law. Although the common law of arrest had very strict rules,
it may be a suprise to many to learn that there were provisions in early
English statutes and holdings in cases allowing constables and the night
watch to detain "suspicious night walkers." Two English authorities on
the common law, Sir Matthew Hale'; and William Hawkins,"0 have
indicated that the power of the night watch and of constables to detain
suspicious persons was usually limited to the hours of darkness. They
had the power to detain such persons until morning. At this time they
were released if no crime was found. If there were grounds for holding
them, they were turned over to the sheriff.
11.

United States v. Bonanno, ISO F. Supp. 71, S0 (S.D.N.Y. 19CO).

12. See, e.g., Prosser, Torts 111 (2d ed. 1955) and commentaries cited therein.
13. See N.Y. Times, Mlarch 9, 1964, p. 3, col. 1.
14. Cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 9S, 104 (1959); People v. Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d
443, 452, 191 N.E.2d 263, 267, 240 N.Y.S.2d 721, 726 (1963).
15. Hale, Pleas of the Crown SS, 97 (Wilson ed. 1SO0).
16. 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 164, 173 (7th ed. 1795).
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Thus, in a civil action for false imprisonment brought by a person who
had been stopped by the night watch because he was carrying a bundle at
night, 17 an English court in the year 1810 stated:
[I]n the night, when the town is to be asleep, and it is the especial duty of these
watchmen, and other officers, to guard against malefactors, it is highly necessary that
they should have such a power of detention. And, in this case, what do you talk of
groundless suspicion? There was abundant ground of suspicion here. We should be
very sorry if the law were otherwise. 18

Apparently the use of the word "suspicion" in connection with stopping
and questioning by police officers was also known in early English
common law. It is also apparent that "mere suspicion" or "groundless
suspicion" was not enough to justify detention by the night watch. An
earlier English case, Queen v. Tooley, 19 was even more explicit in stating
a rule which is as appropriate in our present problem of interpretation of
the new statute as it was in the year 1709. With regard to the power of
a constable to stop persons abroad at night the court said, "it is not the
constable's suspecting, that will justify his taking up a person, but it must
be just grounds of suspicion....",0
It is evident that there is ample precedent in English common law and
statutory law for the use of the word "suspicion" in connection with the
detention and search of suspects upon reasonable suspicion. The Metropolitian Police Act of 18391 authorized the London Police to search
vessels and carriages on reasonable suspicion that they were being used
to convey stolen goods, and also to search persons who may be reasonably
suspected of such possession.' This authority is used extensively by the
London Police today. The London Police, who have been proclaimed as
models for American police agencies, have been stopping several hundred
thousand people a year and asking to see the contents of bags they are
carrying or inquiring as to the possession of other property which might
have been stolen.23
The fact that a practice was accepted under early English common law
and still exists today in England does not, of course, mean that it is good
law under the United States Constitution or even under the New York
State Constitution. It does, however, indicate some precedent for the new
statute and does show that the use of the word "suspicion," with the
17.

Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (1810).

18. Id. at 16, 128 Eng. Rep. at 7.
19. 2 T. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (1709), overruled, Queen v. Davis, L. & C. 64,
71, 169 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1308 (1861).
20. Id. at 1301, 92 Eng. Rep. at 352.
21. 2 & 3 Vict., c. 47, § 66.
22. Williams, Police Detention and Arrest Privileges-England, 51 J. Crim. L., C. &
P.S. 413, 418 (1960).
23. Ibid.
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qualification of just grounds for suspicion, is not a novelty in the criminal
law.

III. Tm LAW iN OTHER STATES: THE UNw0oR

APEST ACT

The Uniform Arrest Act, from which the New York stop and frisk

law was derived, was adopted in New HampshireF and Rhode Islandin 1941. It was enacted into law in Delaware' in 1951.
The provisions of the Uniform Arrest Act are substantially similar
to the New York statute in the two subsections of the act which New
York has adopted. The Uniform Act is broader in scope in that it authorizes stopping for all crimes while the New York law permits stopping only
for felonies and certain misdemeanors, such as possession of dangerous
weapons, burglar's tools, etcY7 Other states and some cities have likewise
enacted similar statutes although they have not adopted the Uniform
Act. 25
A. Detention Statutes
Delaware has three noteworthy cases on the question of stopping and
questioning or temporary detention for investigation. One of these, State
24. N.H. Laws 1941, ch. 163, §§ 1-13, presently contained in N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§§ 594:1-594:23 (1955).
25. RI. Pub. Laws Jan. Sess. 1941, ch. 982, §§ 1-2, prczently contained in RI. Gen.
Laws Ann. §§ 12-7-1 to 12-7-17 (1956). The language of the Uniform Act has varied
slightly as adopted in the three states which have enacted it in toto. Rhode Icland
and New Hampshire use the words "reason to suspect," while Delaware's verion reads
"reasonable ground" to suspect. Compare N.H. Rev. Stat. .Ann. § 594:2 (1955) and
R.L Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-7-1 (1956) with Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1902 (1953).
26. 4S Laws of Delaware 116th Sess. ch. 304 (1951), presently contained in Del. Code
Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1901-1912 (1953).
27. Subdivision 1 of § 2 of the Uniform Act states: "A peace officer may stop
any person abroad who he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime .... 1"Warner, supra note 3, at 344. The New York
Act uses the words: "whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is
about to commit a felony or any of the crimes specified in section five hundred fifty
two of this chapter . . . ." N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § lZ0-a(1). Subdivisions 2 and 3 of
§ 2 of the Uniform Arrest Act authorize the detention of any parson questioned
who fails to identify himself, for a period of up to two hours, while further investigation
takes place. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, supra note 3, at 344. The New York
statute is silent as to what may be done if the person fails or refuses to identify himself
or as to how long a person may be detained. Section 3 of the Uniform Arrest Act (Ibid.)
is practically identical with § 2 of the New York law, which authorizes the search
for dangerous weapons. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 1SO-a(2).
28. E.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 833 (1957); ]l. Rev. Stat. ch. 33, § 657 (1961); Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 41, § 9S (1932); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 84.090, 84.440 (1959); Wis. Stat. § 9S4.03
(1961). Although the Massachusetts act was enacted in 1932 and used by the polic Asince that
time, it was not until this year that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld
its constitutionality as a valid exercise of police power. Commonwealth v. Lehan, 32
U.S.L. Week 2516 (Mass. March 6, 1964).
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v. Gulczynski,2 9 was tried in 1922, long before the passage of the Uniform
Act. It is of interest, however, for its holding on the right of the police to
stop and question a person on the street. Defendant, at his trial for illegal
possession of liquor, moved for the return or destruction of the liquor
contending it was illegally seized, since he had been placed under arrest
without probable cause. The court denied his motion because he was
not arrested until after he admitted having the liquor. 0
The court pointed out that although a person may not be arrested on
suspicion, information or mere belief, an officer may approach and question a suspect without having his action constitute an arrest.3 1 The court
discussed what would constitute an arrest and stated that it was not necessary that an officer place his hand on the accused or otherwise take
possession of his person 3 Under Delaware law, however, the officer
must do or say something from which the accused can reasonably believe
that he is under arrest. He must have reasonable3 ground to believe that he
cannot go away or that his liberty is restrained.
In De Salvatore v. State,34 decided after the passage of the Uniform
Arrest Act in Delaware, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the
act was constitutional even though it permitted detention "upon reasonable grounds to suspect" rather than "reasonable grounds to believe." The
appellant argued that the Uniform Arrest Act was unconstitutional
because it permitted an officer to stop any person whom he has "reasonable ground to suspect" has committed a crime as distinguished from
"reasonable ground to believe," which he maintained was the constitutional requirement for lawful detention and arrest without a warrant. The
appellant contended that arrests or detentions without a warrant are
constitutional only when made on "probable cause" and not on "mere
29. 32 Del. 120, 120 AUt. 88 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1922). The police had information that
defendant was transporting illegal liquor to his store. A uniformed police officer saw
him walking near his store carrying two containers wrapped in paper. When approached
and questioned as to the contents of the package, defendant replied, "what do you
want to know for?" The question was repeated and the same answer received. The
policeman called for another officer and again repeated the question. This time the defendant admitted that he had two gallons of liquor. He was then placed under arrest
and the liquor seized as evidence.
30. Id. at 124-25, 120 AtI. at 90.
31.

Id. at 123, 120 Atl. at 89.

32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960). The defendant in this case had been placed
under a two-hour detention for the purpose of a chemical test to determine whether he
had been intoxicated while driving. The officers had observed him commit a traffic
violation. In light of his appearance and actions, they concluded that he should be given
a sobriety test. The defendant agreed to take the test, the results of which showed a
percentage of alcohol in the blood stream above the critical limit. He was then formally
placed under arrest.
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suspicion." The court agreed that he was correct in arguing that arrests
made without a warrant may be made only upon probable cause, but
pointed out that the act provides for a new category of detention in the
course of the investigation of crime which is not an arrest5 The court
characterized the appellant's attempt to draw a distinction between
reasonable ground to believe and reasonable ground to suspect as a
semantic quibble 0
This case has been interpreted by some writers as holding that there is
no difference between detention under the act and arrest, and that there
is no difference in the probable cause necessary to arrest or to detain
under the Uniform Act.3 7 However, a careful reading of the case indicates
that the court used the term "probable cause" in ruling that the new
statute provided for the requirement of reasonable grounds for detention
because of the issue raised by the defendant that it was unconstitutional
in permitting detention upon mere suspicion. The court stated in its
opinion that the act is constitutional because it does not permit detention
upon mere suspicion but "as appellant says upon probable cause.1 33
Whether the "probable cause" necessary for detention requires the same
quantum of facts and circumstances necessary for probable cause for an
arrest, the court does not make clear. It seems that this could only be
determined upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However,
no court has been able to fashion an exact measure of probable cause
which will suit all cases and circumstances for the purpose of determining if an arrest was legal.
The opinion would have been clearer if the court had not quoted the
term "probable cause" used by the appellant, but had limited itself to
stating that the act was constitutional because it did not authorize an
unreasonable search or seizure of the person of the appellant. According
to the Supreme Court in Brinegarv. United States, 9 the substance of all
of the definitions of probable cause is a " 'reasonable ground for belief of
guilt.' ,4o The opinion of the court in De Salvatore applied the words
"probable cause" to detention which was a new concept of use for the
term.
However, the words "probable cause" were originally used in the fourth
35. Id. at 556, 163 A.2d at 243.

36. Id. at 557, 163 A.2d at 249. This line of reasoning is aLo found in other jurifdictions. See United States v. Rembert, 2S4 Fed. 996 (S.D. Tem. 1922). See also Leagre, The
Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 393, 412 (1963).
37. See, e.g., Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necesrity in the Law of
Arrest?, 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 402, 403 (1960); Kuh, N.Y.L.J, May 29, 1964, p. 4,
col. 1.
3S. 52 Del. at 557, 163 A.2d at 249.
39. 333 U.S. 160 (1949).

40. Id. at 175.
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amendment to the Constitution in the clause referring to warrants. Since
then, of course, it has been extended by interpretation to apply to all
arrests and to all searches and seizures, with or without a warrant. Viewed
in the light of these developments, the use of the term probable cause to
refer to reasonable grounds for detention is not so unusual. The Delaware
41
court clarified its previous ruling in De Salvatore in Cannon v. State,
holding that the Uniform Arrest Act clearly authorizes a "detention"
which is not the same as an arrest. This detention upon reasonable
grounds to suspect is not an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The court held that the act was a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the state and was constitutional.42
4
Rhode Island had a case in the same year, Kavanagh v. Stenlwuse, 0
interpreting the detention provisions of the Uniform Arrest Act, as enacted
in Rhode Island, in a civil suit for false arrest. The Rhode Island court
declared that even if there were no distinction between "detention" and
"arrest" at common law, the state legislature, in the exercise of its broad
police powers could provide for such a distinction, if the period of
detention is reasonably limited, not accompanied by unreasonable and
unnecessary restraint, and is based upon circumstances reasonably suggestive of criminal involvement.4 4 It also found that the words "reason
to suspect" established a just standard for such detention as distinguished
from arrest. These words connote more than mere suspicion. The circumstances must be such that the officer was warranted in concluding that
reasonable grounds for detention did exist."; In this case the jury determined that the officer was justified in his conclusion upon the evidence
presented. The court, however, held that detention was not equal to
arrest.
An appeal from the decision of the Rhode Island court was dismissed
by the United States Supreme Court with a holding that there was no
federal question.46 This dismissal of the appeal cannot be considered as
41. 53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1961).
42. Id. at 288, 168 A.2d at 110.
43. 174 A.2d 560 (R.I. 1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 516 (1962) (per curiam).
Kavanagh and a companion were found at the scene of an accident, after their car
crashed into a pole. They were both taken to the stationhouse because the polico
were not sure who was driving at the time of the accident. After further investigation,
Kavanagh's companion was charged with driving while intoxicated. In a suit for
false arrest, the arresting officer pleaded the Uniform Arrest Act as a defense, and the
jury found for the defendant officer. Kavanagh appealed, claiming that the act was
unconstitutional in that it authorized a detention rather than an arrest.
44. Id. at 562.
45. Id. at 565.
46. 368 U.S. 516 (1962) (per curiam).
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a decision on the merits, so we have no final decision of the highest Court
in the land.47
Therefore, two of the states which have adopted the Uniform Arrest Act
have sustained those sections of the law which are similar to the provisions
in the new statute in New York. Massachusetts, which has had a statute
authorizing detention for investigation since the year 1932, has also
sustained the validity of its law. 48 It seems remarkable that all three of
the major cases in the states of Delaware and Rhode Island should be
concerned with charges of driving while intoxicated. It is also remarkable
that New York has had a special provision in the state Vehicle and
Traffic Law since the year 1929 permitting an arrest without a warrant
for the misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated coupled with an accident, even though the violation was not committed in the officer's
presence. 49 Apparently, no one has seriously challenged the constitutionality of this statute which has authorized arrests in cases similar to
Kavanagl v. Stenhouse for over thirty years.
B. Detention in the Absence of Statutory Authorization
The right of the police to stop and question persons while making an
investigation of a crime, based upon the common law, has been upheld in
several states in the absence of any statutory provisions such as the
Uniform Arrest Act. A 1908 California case, Gisske v. SandersPc involved
a civil action for false imprisonment. The trial court rendered a decision
for the plaintiff, and the police officer appealed to the California Court
of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the lower court. The California court held that a police officer sent to investigate a robbery on the
the street late at night had the right to stop and question a person found
at the scene, and, if he refused to identify or explain himself, to take him
to the police station for investigation. Plaintiff had been released without
charges the next day after identification and his explanation that he just
happened to be passing the scene on his way home. On the way to the
station house the officer had searched him to see if he had any concealed
weapons. The court stated that this was a safety precaution which the
47. Indeed, Mr. Justice Douglas would have waited for a hearing on the merits
before resolving whether there was a federal question. Ibid.
48. Commonwealth v. Lehan, 32 U.S.L. Week 2516 (Mass.

March 6, 1964). See note
28 supra.
49. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 provides: "A police officer may, without a
warrant, arrest a person, in case of a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two, if
such violation is coupled with an accident or collision in which such person is involved,
which in fact has been committed, though not in the police officer's pre:ence, when
he has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by such perzon."
This section is derived from § 70(5)(c) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of 1929.
50. 9 Cal. App. 13, 9S Pac. 43 (Dist. Ct. App. 1903).
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officer might take whether plaintiff was under arrest or not."' Under
California law the police have a right to make inquiry in a proper manner
of anyone upon the public streets at a late hour if the surroundings are
such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands
such identification. 52 In the Gisske case, the fact that crimes had recently
been committed in that neighborhood, that plaintiff was found at a late
hour in the locality, and that he refused to answer questions were circumstances which should lead a reasonable man to investigate further.
Recent California cases have more carefully delineated this right of
the police to stop and question. In People v. Simon," the Supreme Court
of California held that it was reasonable for an officer to question persons
loitering in the warehouse area at night, but found that there were no
reasonable grounds on this fact alone for a search of their persons which
disclosed a marijuana cigarette. 4 This was not a case in which the
officer knew or reasonably believed that a felony had been committed in
the neighborhood as in the Gisske case.
A search may not be justified by what it turned up. Although the court
stated that there is nothing unreasonable in an officer's questioning
persons out of doors late at night, the mere feeling of the officer that the
person had no lawful business there would not justify the search of his
person. 5 The opinion stated that in some circumstances an officer stopping and questioning a person at night might be justified in running his
hands over the person's clothing to protect himself from an attack with
a hidden weapon, but certainly a search so intensive as that made here
could not be so justified.50 A general search or a search based upon unfounded suspicion is not justified under the California rule. The evidence
of the possession of narcotics in this case was suppressed and the charge
dismissed.
People v. Ambrose5 7 is a later California case which upheld the right of
the police to stop and question under suspicious circumstances. In this
case the police saw the defendant walking with a flashlight and gloves
sticking out of his pocket in a neighborhood where there had been recent
burglaries. They stopped and questioned him, and, after getting unsatisfactory answers, searched and took a screwdriver from his pocket. The
court held that under the circumstances they were justified in concluding
51. Id. at 16, 98 Pac. at 45.
52. Cal. Pen. Code § 833.
53. 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955).
54. Id. at 649-50, 290 P.2d at 534-35. At the time this case was decided, California
bad adopted the exclusionary rule as to illegally obtained evidence. People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
55. 45 Cal. 2d at 650, 290 P.2d at 534-35.
56. Id. at 650, 290 P.2d at 534.
57. 155 Cal. App. 2d 513, 318 P.2d 181 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
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that a person carrying a flashlight and a pair of gloves was a suspicious
person and they were entitled to question him. These circumstances,
coupled with the false answers defendant gave to the questioning officers,
were held to be sufficient grounds to justify an arrest. 8s
People v. Blodgett 9 shows how far some states have gone without any
special legislation. The California Supreme Court upheld the right of
police officers, who observed a taxicab double parked outside a hotel at
3: 00 A.M. and the defendant and two others getting in and out of the cab,
to approach and order the occupants out of the cab for investigation.
When they saw the defendent shove his hand down beside the seat
cushion, they searched the cab and found marijuana cigarettes beside
the seat cushion. California had previously adopted the exclusionary
rule, 0 so the defendant moved to exclude the evidence of the narcotics
as unlawfully seized. The court denied his appeal and held that in view of
the late hour and the unusual conduct of the occupants of the cab, it was
not unreasonable for the officers to approach and to order them out of the
cab for questioning. When the officers observed the defendant's furtive
action as he got out, they had reasonable grounds for believing that he
was hiding contraband and the search of the cab was therefore reasonable.
From the decision in this case it appears that California has been much
more elastic in its interpretation of the exclusionary rule than New York
has been. 1 It apparently was much less strict than the Supreme Court in
02
Henry v. United States.
Illinois has also held, in People v. Henneman1 and Pcople v. D.am,"
that the police have the right to stop and question suspicious persons. In
Henneman the court said:
That the officers had a right to stop and question plaintiff in error and his companion
cannot be doubted, and if there were disclosed by such questioning, facts which v-ould
tend to establish suspicion that plaintiff in error was engaged in or had been guilty of
a crime, his arrest, made as a result of such belief on the part of the officers, v;ould be
a legal arrest and a search following such an arrest would not be an unreasonable
search.f 5
This ruling in Henneman might be considered dicta because the
Illinois Supreme Court then went on to hold that the officers had not
merely stopped and questioned the defendants but had approached their
58. Id. at 516-17, 524, 318 P.2d at 184, 189.
59. 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956).
60. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
61. Compare People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956), with People v.
Moore, 11 N.Y.2d 271, 133 N.E.2d 225, 22S N.Y.S.2d 822 (1962).
62. 361 U.S. 93 (1959).
63. 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937).
64. 3S2 IMI.204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943).
65. 367 M11.
at 154, 10 N.E.2d at 650-51.
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car, immediately ordered them out, searched the car and found two guns
for the unlawful possession of which they were convicted. However, the
same Supreme Court of Illinois in Exum reaffirmed its position in Henneman and upheld the right of the police to stop and question the appellant
in this later case. The court, in Exum, stated that all of the circumstances
must be taken into consideration to determine if reasonable grounds
existed.6 6 Among these were the lateness of the hour, the fact that the
police were investigating two thefts in the neighborhood, that they saw
the defendant crouched down toward the right hand door of his parked
car, that the car had a Missouri license plate and that the defendant was a
Negro in a white neighborhood. Also, when the policeman approached and
questioned defendant, they saw a camera, a key cutting machine and an
automobile code book on the seat of the car. When questioned about these,
the defendant said that he did not know to whom they belonged although
he produced a license for the car. He was then placed under arrest and
when searched, property previously reported stolen was found in his
possession. The court said that in its opinion: "[I] t was [not] unreasonable for the officers to believe, nor can we say that a prudent and cautious
man would not have strongly suspicioned, under the existing circumstances, that the defendant had been engaged in the commission of a
,67
crime."
It is apparent that both by case law and by statute in other states,0 8
there has been ample precedent for the amendment to New York's Code
of Criminal Procedure authorizing the stopping and questioning of persons
upon reasonable grounds. Similar rules of law have existed in other states
for many years without a successful challenge.

IV.

FEDERAL COURT DEcIsIoNs

Although there are no federal cases specifically related to the Uniform
Arrest Act, the question of investigation versus arrest has been considered,
and there are many federal court decisions on "probable cause" and
"reasonable grounds" for an arrest which will be of value in interpreting
state law, particularly now that the exclusionary rule applies to all of the
states. The classic statement of probable cause was made by Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall in Locke v. United States: 9 "It [probable cause] imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion."7 0
66. 382 INI. at 212, 47 N.E.2d at 60.
67. Ibid.
68. In addition to the states discussed in the text, Missouri in State v. Cantrell, 310
S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958); Oklahoma in Hargus v. State, 58 Okla. Crim. 301,
54 P.2d 211 (1935); Oregon in City of Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 427, 210 P.2d
577, 585 (1949); and West Virginia in State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518
(1932), have upheld the right and duty of the police to stop and question under reasonable
circumstances.
69. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
70. Id. at 348.
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that mere suspicion
is not enough for probable cause. The majority of the Supreme Court
made this point abundantly clear in Henry v. United States.7 In this
case, FBI agents investigating a reported theft of liquor from an interstate shipment had information that an associate of the defendant was
involved. The agents were following him when they saw him load a car
with cartons from an alleyway in a residential district. The agents followed the car and waved it to a stop. When they approached the car they
could see that the cartons in the seat bore labels addressed to an out-ofstate company. The cartons were later identified as containing radios
stolen from an interstate shipment.
The majority of the Supreme Court held that there was no probable
cause for the arrest and that the evidence of the stolen property could
not be admitted since it was the result of an unlawful search and seizure. The prosecution in this case, however, had conceded that the arrest
took place when the agents stopped the car in which the defendant was
riding, and the majority agreed that this was their view of the facts:
"When the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty
of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case, was complete." 3 Mr.
Justice Douglas, in discussing probable cause, stated that evidence
required to establish guilt it not necessary, but good faith on the part of
the officer is not enough: 7 "Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the
7
offense has been committed. 5
Further explanations offered by the Court in this case are valuable as
a guide to the interpretation of probable cause in arrests under state
law and the new question in New York of reasonable grounds for stopping
and questioning. Mr. Justice Douglas explained that the mere fact that
packages have been stolen does not make every man who carries a package subject to arrest or the package subject to seizure.7 6 However, the
shape and design of the package may be sufficient to provide probable
cause, as may also the weight of it or the manner in which it is being
carried, or flight or furtive actions on the part of the person carrying it.
Mr. Justice Clark, in his dissenting opinion, believed that the mere
stopping of the car did not amount to an arrest.7 7 In his opinion, the
earlier events disclosed ample grounds to justify the stopping of the car
and the questioning of the occupants. The sight of the cartons during this
71.

361 U.S. 98 (1959).

72. Id. at 102-04.
73. Id. at 103.
74. Id. at 102.

75. Ibid; see Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 420, 4S6 (1958); United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 592 (194S).
76. 361 U.S. at 104.

77. Id. at 106 (dissenting opinion).
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questioning, plus the obviously false answers of the defendant, gave the
agents probable cause for arrest. 78
The majority opinion left no room for consideration of the possibility
of a period of investigation rather than an arrest. However, since the
case was decided on the agreed statement of facts that the arrest took
place the instant that the car was stopped, there was no real issue of
investigation or arrest to be determined.
However, in Rios v. United States," this question was considered in a
case involving the arrest of a person for possession of narcotics. The
defendant was apprehended while alighting from a taxicab which had
stopped at a red light. The Court held that there was a question of fact
as to whether the officers were still in the process of investigating when
they approached the taxicab and saw the defendant drop a recognizable
package of narcotics on the floor of the cab; or whether there was an
immediate arrest as soon as they reached the cab and before they saw
the narcotics." If they were still in the process of investigation when they
saw the narcotics, a subsequent arrest would be valid and the evidence
of possession would be admissible. If the arrest had taken place before
the narcotics were seen, then they had no probable cause at the instant
of arrest and the evidence must be suppressed. The case was remanded
for a new trial, which apparently was never held.
In United States v. Vita,"' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that a period of detention for investigation for
over eight hours did not constitute an arrest. Since the defendant had
been stopped by FBI agents on the sidewalk outside of his hotel at
about 10:00 A.M. and was requested to come to FBI headquarters where
he was not formally placed under arrest until 6:52 P.M., he sought the
suppression of a confession obtained during the period of detention under
the rule of Mallory v. United States.8 The trial court found that he went
voluntarily with the agents upon their request, so that there was no illegal
detention so as to bar the confession. 3 However, because of the length
of time involved in the period of detention, the Second Circuit considered
the question of his status during the day and held that he was being
detained for investigation and not under arrest. The court stated:
Moreover, even if Vita had been involuntarily detained for questioning or had
believed that he had no choice but to accompany the F.B.I. agents to headquarters,
we would not necessarily hold such detention to be an "arrest" within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a). The rule does not apply to a case in which
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Ibid.
364 U.S. 253 (1960).
Id. at 262.
294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962).
354 U.S. 449 (1957).
United States v. Vita, 294 F. Supp. 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
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federal officers detain a suspect for a short and reasonable period in order to question
him. The right to question has its roots in early English practice and was approved by
the common law commentators and the courts... .This prerogative of police officers
to detain persons for questioning is not only necessary in order to enable the authorities to apprehend, arrest, and charge those who are implicated; it also protects those
who are readily able to exculpate themselves from being arrested and having formal

charges made against them before their explanations are considered.8 4

A complete discussion of New York law on detention for investigation,

rather than arrest, may be found in United States v. Bonanno.' This
was a ruling by Judge Irving R. Kaufman on a motion by the defendant,
one of those attending the so-called Apalachin conference, for the suppression of evidence gathered by the police during an investigation.
Fifty-eight persons, allegedly belonging to that organization which has
been variously described before Senate committees as the Mafia, the
Syndicate and Cosa Nostra, gathered on the estate of Joseph Barbara,
Sr., in Apalachin, New York for reasons officially unknown. The state
police with some federal agents waited outside of the estate on the public
road and stopped all of the cars coming out. They not only asked the
drivers for identification but also all of the passengers. After identification
they allowed them to drive on, until it began raining, at which time they
stopped the cars and told them to go to the police station, where they
were asked to produce identification and questioned as to what they were
doing at Barbara's estate. After this they were allowed to leave. Anyone
who refused to answer was not questioned further or detained but was
recognized by the officers. They were later indicted on federal charges
of conspiracy to obstruct justice by giving false testimony. They moved
to suppress the information as to identity and the conflicting statements
given to the police during the time they were stopped and questioned,
claiming it was unlawfully obtained during an illegal arrest.
The court held that there had been no arrest in the technical sense
since the New York Code of Criminal Procedure defines arrest as taking
a person into custody that he may be held to answer for a crime.P There
was no intent upon the part of the police to hold anyone on a charge of
crime, but only to stop and identify those present at a gathering of
known criminals. The court did not base its decision solely upon the fact
that there was no technical arrest, or upon the intent of the police, but
examined the whole question of investigation and temporary detention in
84. 294 F.2d at 529-30. The Supreme Court's recent holding in Escohbedo v. flinois, 357
U.S. 902 (1964), would not affect the ruling in Vita. There was no failure to warn defendant of his right to counsel. Escobedo recognized the power of the police to investigate,
but held that when the investigation was no longer a general inquiry but began to focus
on the person, the accused was entitled to counsel.
85. 10 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Bufalino, 235 F.2d 40S (2d Cir. 1960).
86. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 167.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

the light of the fourth amendment to the Constitution. 7 The conclusion
reached was that not every temporary restriction of absolute freedom of
movement is an illegal police action demanding suppression of the resultant evidence.88
V. NEw YORK DECISIONS

Persons who have been shocked by the use of the word "suspects" in
the new statute will be even more surprised at its use in New York cases
both old and new. 89

Limbeck v. Gerry9 ° is the leading case in New York involving civil

suits for damages for false arrest. The issue in the case was whether
there had been an arrest or whether there had been a voluntary submission
to investigation. Some jewelry had been taken from Gerry's house, and
the police took a maid servant to the police station where she was questioned, made a statement and was released without charges. The court
held that it was a question of fact for the jury to decide if there had been
an arrest or if the maid had voluntarily gone to the stationhouse with the

detectives. The court, in this 1896 case, stated the general rule which has
prevailed in civil suits for false arrests ever since.
Any deprivation of the liberty of another, without his consent, whether it be by
actual violence, threats or otherwise, constitutes an imprisonment within the meaning
of the law.9 '
However the court also stated:
When a felony has been committed the police are charged with the duty of investigating it, in order to ascertain who has committed it; and for that purpose may request the attendance at the police station for the purpose of examination of all persons
whom they have reason to92believe have any knowledge of the offense or the means
whereby it was committed.

The jury found for the defendant in this case holding that there was
no arrest but that the plaintiff had voluntarily submitted to investigation.
87. 180 F. Supp. at 77-86.
88. Id. at 78.
89. See generally People v. Morgan, 13 N.Y. Supp. 448 (Sup. Ct. 1891), a "stop
and frisk" case without the authorization of any applicable statute. The court held that
the demeanor and answers of the accused, the time of night and the fact that he was
loitering on a street justified a conviction based upon a frisk and finding of burglar's
tools. People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y. Supp. 326 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1922), approved
the stopping and frisking of the defendant as being incident to a lawful arrest. The court held
that the circumstances including the defendant loitering on the street late at night, glancing at
the officer repeatedly, and retreating rapidly at the officer's approach could reasonably
be taken as flight. The fact that Esposito held both hands in his coat pocket when
the officer stopped him justified a frisk and the finding of the unlawfully possessed gun.
90. 15 Misc. 663, 39 N.Y. Supp. 95 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
91. Id. at 668, 39 N.Y. Supp. at 97.
92. Id. at 669, 39 N.Y. Supp. at 98.
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The court's definition of probable cause in this early case is also interesting in its use of the word "suspicion."
Probably cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in his belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is chargedY3

The rule in this case, which has been followed in many other cases,
that any restraint upon the liberty of movement of another constitutes
an arrest or imprisonment, 4 ignores the statutory definition of an arrest. 3
In a civil suit for damages for false arrest this rule does not do any substantial harm since a jury will usually give just compensation for the
arrest of an innocent person whether there was probable cause for the
arrest or not. However, as a rule to be followed by a criminal court
judge in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, it will not suffice.
People v. Coffey," is a recent case which is particularly interesting
because of the court's use of the word "suspicion ' in finding probable
cause for an arrest. If the court of appeals quotes with approval the use
of the word "suspicion" to indicate what it means by reasonable grounds
for a lawful arrest without a warrant, 7 it seems that it should be permissible for the state legislature to use the word "suspects" to indicate what
it means by reasonable grounds for stopping and questioning a person.
Since Mapp v. Ohio"8 imposed the exclusionary rule upon all of the
states, New York courts have granted motions to suppress evidence as
illegally seized in many cases. Most of these cases were based upon a
finding that a search and seizure took place after an arrest which was
declared invalid because it was not based upon probable cause. Usually
there was no question of an investigation, but rather an immediate or
summary arrest was involved, as in People v. MooreY9 and People v.
Loria.0 Until very recently the New York courts made no mention of,
or gave any consideration to, the question of investigation as differentiated from arrest.
The supreme court in People v. Salernw1 ' specifically upheld the
right of the police to stop and question the defendant under suspicious
circumstances and ultimately to "frisk" and discover an unlicensed
pistol. A motion to suppress was denied a year and a half before the
effective date of the amendment to section 1SO-a of the Code of Criminal
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 674, 39 N.Y. Supp. at 101.
Id. at 66S-75, 39 N.Y. Supp. at 97-101.
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 167.
12 N.Y.2d 443, 191 N.E.2d 263, 240 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1963).
Id. at 451, 191 N.E.2d at 266, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11 N.Y.2d 271, IS3 NXE.2d 225, 22S N.Y..2d 822 (1962).
10 N.Y.2d 36S, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
3S Alisc. 2d 467, 235 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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Procedure, but the court referred to the Uniform Arrest Act in other
states with approval. The court stated that there was "substantial
authority for the right of the police under certain circumstances to take
02
investigatory action not amounting to either a search or an arrest.)"
The court found that at the time of the search in Salerno, the officers
had sufficient facts to have probable cause for a search. They were the
time of night, the way the defendant was dressed, the fact that he was
carrying a loaded shotgun, had given false answers to their questions, and
had stated that he was going hunting, which would constitute a misdemeanor within the city limits.'0 3 The court also stated that having
decided reasonably to investigate further, the officers were entitled to
"frisk" for hidden weapons which might endanger their lives: "Under
the circumstances, the 'frisking' . . represented no more than a proper
balance between the constitutional rights of the officers and the public
and the constitutional right of the defendant to his
to their lives
10 4
privacy.')
New York appellate courts are now overruling lower court decisions
on the suppression of evidence which either ignored the question of investigation as distinguished from arrest, or adverted to it briefly only
to reject it summarily. Justice Nathan R. Sobel, who has written
extensively on the constitutional issues in searches and arrests,105 in
his ruling to suppress the evidence in People v. Estrialgo,0° conceded that
the police have the right to detain during an investigation but held that
this right is severely restricted. 07 The lower court held that an arrest
took place when the police, in order to verify defendant's alleged destination, placed him in a car to drive him to the address given. 0 8
The appellate division sharply rejected this view of the limitations
placed upon the police investigation, and, in reversing, stated:
The precise time at which an "arrest" occurred . . . should be determined as a

question of fact whenever such time becomes a relevent [sic] factor .... Inthe present
case, it should be borne in mind that police have the right to approach persons for

the purpose of routine investigation; and that such investigation does not constitute
arrest .... Whether the detention of this defendant for questioning was for more
than a reasonable period of time should be determined as a question of fact within the

rules stated in United States v. Vita ....1o9
102. Id. at 472, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
103. Id. at 471-72, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
104. Id. at 474, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
105. Sobel, Current Problems in the Law of Search and Seizure (1964); Sobel, The
Pleader: A Comment on the Law of Search and Seizure (1961).
106. 37 Misc. 2d 264, 233 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1962), rev'd sub nom. People v.
Entrialgo, 19 App. Div. 2d 509, 245 N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dep't 1963) (per curiam), afl'd mom.,
14 N.Y.2d 733, 199 N.E.2d 384, 250 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1964).
107. 37 Misc. 2d at 282, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 576-77.
108. Id. at 284, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
109. 19 App. Div. 2d at 511, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
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In People v. Garcia,110 a case involving a search before an arrest, the
appellate division reversed a lower court ruling on a motion for the
suppression of evidence and held that the police were entitled to use
their reasoning faculties upon all of the facts of which they had special
knowledge. This case is unique in New York in that it permitted a search
before the arrest and authorized the finding of probable cause based upon
facts and circumstances which would appear innocuous to the average
reasonable man but would be recognizable to an expert in burglary investigation as the modus operandi of an apartment house burglar. This
decision is consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions which
have approved searches which took place before, but were incident to,
the arrest-provided there was probable cause for the arrest at the time
of the search.'1 1 The New York courts apparently are now willing to
follow this rule.
At about the same time that the Supreme Court, Bronx County, was
authorizing stopping and frisking in Salerno, the Supreme Court, New
York County, reached an exactly opposite conclusion as to the suppression of evidence in People v. Rivera."' The New York Court of Appeals,
in a landmark decision reversing the ruling of the lower court suppressing
the evidence, held that under New York law the police have a right to
stop and question a person under circumstances which would reasonably
require investigation' and also to frisk the person being questioned as
an incident to the inquiry." 4 The "stop and frisk" amendmentlr did not
apply to this case, although the same principles underlie both the new
statute and the validity of the police action in Rivera. Of course, if the
highest court in the state upholds the right of the police to stop, question
and frisk without the authorization of a special statute, it is reasonable to
expect that they will uphold the right to stop and frisk under the new
statute.
110.

20 App. Div. 2d S55, 248 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam). Detectives

assigned to a special burglary squad knew that the defendants had been arrcsted and
charged with burglary in another county and were keeping them under surveillance. They

followed them on three different days to the Park Avenue residential area in Manhattan
and watched them going into one apartment house after another. On the third day, when
they came out of an apartment house, one was carrying a woman's male up kit. The
detectives stopped them, opened the bag and discovered a mink coat. They then placed
the defendants under arrest and after checking the apartment house, found the
apartment from which the mink coat had been taken.
111. Ker v. California, 374 US. 23 (1963) ; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
112. 38 IIisc. 2d 5S6, 233 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem. 19 App. Div. 2d E63,
245 N.YS.2d 1039 (1st Dep't 1963), rev'd, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d
453 (1964).
113. 14 N.Y.2d at 445, 201 N.E.2d at 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62.
114. Id. at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
115. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 150-a.
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In Rivera, three detectives in plain clothes were on patrol in an unmarked car at 1:30 A.M. in a neighborhood on the lower east side of
Manhattan where there had been quite a bit of crime, including robberies
and assaults. They were parked in the vicinity of a bar and grill and
observed the defendant and another man walking back and forth along
the sidewalk looking into the window of the bar and grill for about five
minutes. The defendant looked in the direction of the car, said something
to his companion and started walking rapidly in the opposite direction.
The police jumped out of the car and shouted for them to stop. When
they did, one detective, without further conversation, patted the outside
of their clothing, as he said: "for my own protection." He felt what
seemed to be a gun in defendant's pocket, reached in and removed a
loaded pistol. Defendant was charged with possession of a concealed
weapon without a license. He moved to suppress the evidence as inadmissible, contending it was the result of an unlawful search made after an
arrest which was made without probable cause." 0
The court of appeals, in reversing, stated that the first problem is the
authority of the police in the circumstances here to stop and question
the defendant. The validity of the subsequent police action would
necessarily rest upon the initial right to stop the defendant and make
the immediate inquiry on the street. 1 7 The court ruled that the authority
of the police to stop the defendant and question the defendant in the
circumstances shown here, is perfectly clear: "The business of the police
is to prevent crime ....Prompt inquiry into suspicious or unusual street
action is an indispensable police power in the orderly government of
large urban communities."" 8 The court held that the reasons for stopping
to question rieed not be of the same degree or measure of conclusiveness
as that required for an arrest. The detention on the street to make an
inquiry is not an arrest, and the ground upon which the police may stop
and question may be less than the grounds necessary for an arrest." 9
116. 38 Misc. 2d at 587, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 621. On the motion to suppress in the trial
court, the People conceded, and the court found, that at the time the detective made the
frisk he had no probable cause to arrest the defendant. The defense counsel conceded
that under the circumstances, the detectives had the right to detain defendant for
questioning but denied that they had the right to search him for dangerous weapons.
Id. at 587, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22. The People contended that a frisk is not a search for
evidence, but a protective measure necessary for the performance of police duty. Id. at
588-89, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 622. The lower court, holding that a frisk was a search and was
illegal on the facts of this case, required the suppression of the evidence-the gun. Id. at
589, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 642. The fact that the prosecutor, unnecessarily it seems, conceded
that .the officer had no probable cause for an arrest, makes this case, of necessity, a ruling
strictly on the right to stop and frisk without probable cause for an arrest.
117. 14 N.Y.2d at 444, 201 N.E.2d at 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
118. Ibid.
119. Id. at 445, 201 N.E.2d at 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
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After accepting the right of the police to stop and question under proper
circumstances, the court then recognized the fact that the answer to the
question propounded by the police under such circumstances might be
a bullet. The court held that a "frisk is a reasonable and constitutionally
permissible precaution to minimize that danger." 0 The frisk in this case
was the contact or patting of the outer clothing of a person to detect if
a concealed weapon was being carried. A frisk is an invasion of an
individual's right of privacy, but so is the stopping and questioning in the
first instance, which was justified under the circumstances here. A frisk
is less of an invasion of privacy than a full search of the person. It is
justified on less conclusive grounds than a full search, just as stopping and
questioning may be justified on less than the grounds necessary for an
arrest."2 From the time the detective, in the process of frisking the defendant, touched the object which he inferred correctly to be a gun, there was
probable cause to arrest the defendant and to proceed further to make
a full search and take the gun.
Judge Fuld, the sole dissenter in Rivera, objected that the issue is not
the right of the police to stop and question, but rather the search of the
person of an individual without probable cause for an arrest a He felt
it was an unconstitutional police tactic which removed the gun from
Rivera's pocket and was an invasion of his privacy condemned by the
fourth amendment. In his opinion, the power to conduct a search was
being given to the police based upon their subjective feeling that they
were in danger.3
Judge Fuld stated that both court decisions and dictionaries define a
"frisk" as a search. Neither the fourth amendment nor the common law
of torts, according to his opinion, distinguishes between the slightest
touching and a more elaborate search. He cited Henry v. United
States,"' to show that police conduct is not justified by what a subsequent
search discloses and that suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay
hands on a citizen. He held that if the police officer had no probable
cause to believe that a crime had been or was being committed at the
time he approached, his act of running his hands over the defendant's
clothing cannot be considered reasonable by constitutional standards.
He stated that if the gun discovered by this search is admitted into
evidence, the exclusionary rule of the Mapp case is being circumvented.
Judge Fuld did recognize that the police in the proper performance of
their duties had a responsibility to investigate suspicious activity and that
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
361

at 446, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463
at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
at 44S, 201 N.E.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 465 (diienting opinion).
at 451, 201 N.E.2d at 3S, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 467 (dissenting opinion).
U.S. 98 (1959).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

stopping and questioning individuals was permissible; but, the power to
investigate does not give the police the right to search except incident
to an arrest, 125 and that the solution lies in the police adopting other
means to safeguard themselves while questioning. 20
VI.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

The issue of the constitutionality of the stop and frisk statutes or
the right to stop and frisk under common law has never been decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Judge Fuld, in his dissenting
opinion in Rivera, discussed the issue at some length and the majority
opinion by Judge Bergen specifically upheld the constitutionality of the
action by the police in stopping, questioning and frisking under the facts
of the case. The decision declared: "A State is not precluded from
'developing workable rules' governing searches to meet 'the practical
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' if the
State does not violate the constitutional standard of what is reason1
able ....
1

27

Ker v. California1 2 held that Mapp v. Ohio did not establish

supervisory authority over the state courts and implied no obliteration of
the state laws relating to arrests and searches. 2 The reasonableness of
the search is for the trial court to determine in the first instance from the
facts and circumstances of the case, in the light of the "fundamental
criteria" laid down by the fourth amendment and the opinions of the
Supreme Court applying that amendment. 8 0 On appeal the findings of the
state courts will be examined by the Supreme Court, which will, where
necessary to the determination of constitutional rights of the individual,
make "an independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the
record .... ,31
The Ker case also held that the lawfulness of an arrest without a
warrant is to be determined by reference to state law. 2 The Court in
Ker recognized the judicial exception made to the California law of
arrest, which permitted officers to break and enter in making an arrest
without first knocking and announcing their authority. 8 3 It seems just
as valid for the Court to hold that the stopping, questioning, and frisking
of persons, upon reasonable grounds, sanctioned by the law of New York
is not unreasonable under the standards of the fourth amendment as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
125.

14 N.Y.2d at 451, 201 N.E.2d at 38, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 467 (dissenting opinion).

126.

Id. at 452, 201 N.E.2d at 39, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 468 (dissenting opinion).

127.

Id. at 448, 201 N.E.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 464.

128.
129.
130.

374 U.S. 23 (1963).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33.

131.
132.
133.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 37.
Ibid.
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Judge Nathan R. Sobel of the Kings County Supreme Court believes
that Ker commands federal standards upon state courts even to mandating fact-finding according to federal standards. 3" However Associate
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court has emphasized in
his writings 3 ' that there is no mandate to the states that they must abide
by the various interpretations of the exclusionary rule in the federal
courts----"interpretations freighted with orthodox property and tort con13
cepts.""' Judge Traynor, who wrote the opinion in People v. Cahan, T
which was mentioned with approval by the United States Supreme
Court in several cases, 138 specifically stated that the state courts need
not follow the needless refinements of federal law and that the adoption
of the exclusionary rule need not introduce confusion into the law of
criminal procedure.13 9 He has stated further that there is nothing in
Mapp which specifies what constitutes lawful arrest in the states, and
nothing regarding the large question of permissible investigation before
arrest. 4 In the determination of cases involving arrests which developed
after the police stopped and questioned persons on the street, the question
of whether the police had the right to stop and question under the circumstances of the case must be determined, as well as whether there was
probable cause for arrest at the instant of the arrest.
The lawfulness of an arrest cannot be determined by whether or not
a jury ultimately convicts the defendant. The test of the legality of an
arrest is whether there was probable cause for the arrest at the instant
of the arrest.' 4 ' Whether or not a person is convicted is affected by many
things which can happen after the arrest, such as the loss of evidence,
a break in the chain of handling evidence, the death of witnesses, the
skill of a defense attorney or lack of preparation on the part of the
prosecutor, and many other things which may result in a failure to find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. On a motion to suppress
before trial, obviously there is no jury and the judge must be the finder of
the facts. If he finds that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe
that the person had committed a crime at the instant of arrest and the
other requirements of the law of arrest have been met, the arrest was
lawful, no matter how the ultimate prosecution turns out.
134. Sobel, op. cit.
supra note 105, at 10.
135. See Traynor, AIapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duhe LJ.319.
136. Id. at 320.
137. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
138. E.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1963); Mlapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
651-52 (1961); Elk-ins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220-21 (1960).
139. 44 Cal. 2d at 451, 2S2 P.2d at 914-15.
140. Traynor, supra note 135, at 342.
141. E.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959).
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The Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution does not forbid
all searches but only unreasonable searches and seizures. 42 However,
what is an unreasonable search within the fourth amendment depends
upon the shifting views of the members of the Court and has never been
clearly resolved for the benefit of lower courts or law enforcement
agencies. Most of the cases of searches incident to an arrest have been
concerned with searches of homes or other buildings. Next in number
the Court has considered a line of cases dealing with vehicles.14 The
number of cases involving arrests and searches of a pedestrian have been
few. Draper v. United States144 is the leading case involving a person on
foot, where defendant apparently was arrested while leaving a train.
Therefore most of the discussions of probable cause and the validity of
searches and seizures have related to searches of the home with the added
factor of the invasion of the privacy of the home. The inviolability of a
man's castle and the fear of the midnight knock on the door is not an
element of the normal summary arrest on the street. The necessity to stop
and identify or allow the possible criminal to escape adds another factor
to the consideration of what is reasonable or unreasonable.
The decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that an arrest without a warrant must be based upon probable cause. In Draper, probable
cause was found by the Court to exist upon mere hearsay information
from a previously reliable informer plus observation by the officers
that the suspect matched the description given by the informer. In Irby
v. United States,145 probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
was held to exist where the federal narcotics agents only had hearsay
information from an informer of no previous reliability, plus their
observation of the activity of narcotics addicts, 40 which would appear
innocuous to the average person. If probable cause may be made out for
an arrest with or without a warrant on circumstances such as these, it
should be no more difficult to make out reasonable grounds for stopping
and frisking.
VII. CONCLUSION

There is a valid distinction between an arrest and the temporary
detention in the stop and frisk law. Every temporary restraint on liberty
of movement is not an arrest. However, the conclusion based upon these
142. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
143. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
144. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). See also Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959); Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 917 (1959).
145. 314 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
146. Id. at 253.
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distinctions that the fourth amendment should not apply to the temporary
detention necessary for stopping and frisking is not sound logic. The
fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness should apply to stopping and frisking. There must be some reasonable cause for the detention,
or the constitutional prohibition against general searches has been evaded
and rendered ineffective. Determination of the exact amount of facts,
hearsay or circumstances necessary to constitute probable cause for an
arrest is almost impossible to predict. It seems, however, that similar
but lesser combinations of hearsay, facts and circumstances should be
sufficient to make out reasonable grounds for temporary detention for
investigation. Mere suspicion is not enough, but the knowledge and
experience gained by trained officers should be considered by the court in
determining if there was reasonable cause. The test should be what was
known to the particular specially trained police officer who made the
arrest, rather than what would appear to the average reasonable man.
It is impossible for appellate courts to find reasonable grounds for an
arrest if it does not appear in the record. One of the sources of the difficulty is the inarticulateness of the police, particularly when trying to
comply with the rules of evidence in a trial. The hearing on the motion
to suppress evidence, prior to trial, where hearsay and background information are acceptable gives greater opportunity for the determination
of probable cause. The glib statement that, "the ctrained nose' of a gendarme is not an adequate substitute for the United States Constitution,"' **sounds like a telling thrust, but obviously no amount of training or experience will make an officer's nose any better than any other person's. His
experience with past crimes, his observation of the actions of criminals,
and his training in the miodus operandi of criminals gives him a specialized type of knowledge. This coupled with observation of certain actions
requires only the mental process known as simple apprehension for him
to have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime is being committed.
To illustrate, a New York newspaper printed a story about a lieutenant
in a police stationhouse who glanced out a window, saw one man walk
past another man on the street, stop, turn back and start to wipe off the
front of the other's suit with his handkerchief. The officer ran out and
stopped both men. He asked the man whose coat had been brushed off if
he had a wallet. The man put his hand in his pocket and found that his
wallet was gone. The wallet was produced by the solicitous one when he
was ordered to hand it over. The officer knew from his past experience
that he was watching a favorite trick of pickpockets, who walk past their
victim, then turn back with profuse apologies for accidentally spitting on
him and vigorously wipe off the victim's coat with a handkerchief, while
147. People v. Brown, 32 MiSC. 2d S46, S49, 225 N.Y.S.2d 157, 161 (Quavis County
Ct. 1962).
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he lifts his wallet. 148 To the average person the activity would have
been meaningless. To the trained officer it was reasonable grounds for
suspecting that a crime was being committed in his presence, even though
he could not see all of the elements necessary to prove the commission
of the crime in court. He investigated in the usual manner by stopping
and questioning and developed the evidence necessary for the proof of
the crime, and probable cause for an arrest.
According to Mr. Justice Douglas in Henry v. United States,14 the
fact that a package has been stolen does not authorize the police to stop
and question everyone carrying a package. However, if the size and
shape of the package match the stolen one, or if the furtive manner or
flight of a person carrying the package is added to the other circumstances, probable cause for arrest may be made out. In such circumstances
the police would at least have reasonable grounds for stopping and
questioning.
Mr. Justice Jackson in Brinegar v. United States,150 indicated that it
would seem reasonable for the police to stop and search every car leaving
the neighborhood of a kidnapping. United States v. Bonanno,'5 ' held that
the police may temporarily detain and question all persons in a car,
when there are additional circumstances such as a meeting of known
criminals with other unknown persons. The New York State Vehicle and
Traffic Law grants the police the right to demand the presentation of a
driver's license and registration for the vehicle from the operator of any
motor vehicle. 152 The opinion in Bonanno declared that it was obvious
that the police had the right to detain and question everyone found standing around the body of a murder victim, and indicated that the same right
should apply to persons leaving the location of any serious crime. The
Gisske 53 case in California and the Exum5 4 case in Illinois reached the
same conclusion.
People v. Salerno5 5 held that the official crime statistics published
by the FBI for the city of occurrence should be taken into consideration in determining the reasonableness of police action in stopping
and questioning.
It seems even more appropriate to consider the Uniform Crime
Reports' 5 6 on the number of police officers killed in the performance of
148. N.Y. Daily News, July 15, 1964, p. 38, col. 1.
149. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
150. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
151. 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
152. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 401(4).
153. Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (Dist. Ct. App. 1908).
154. People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943).
155. 38 Misc. 2d 467, 234 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
156. 1963 FBI Uniform Crime Reports.
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duty in connection with the reasonableness of the right to frisk, when
the officer believes he is in danger. According to the latest report, fifty-five
police officers were murdered in the performance of duty in the year
1963.151 A detailed study of 16S police killed by criminals during the last
four years shows that twenty-six per cent of the officers were killed
making arrests or transporting prisoners. 15s It is reasonable to assume
that failure to frisk, or an ineffective frisk accounted for a large percentage of the killings while transporting prisoners and possibly also in the
0 9 Forty-two officers
cases of arrests.Y
were killed when they interrupted
robberies and twenty-one were killed by burglars.1c° These two classifications include a number of incidents where police were making what
appeared to be routine stops for traffic violations, but, unknown to the
officers, the occupants of the automobiles were fleeing the scene of robberies or burglaries.1 61 Eighteen were killed investigating reports of
suspicious persons.16 "
According to the report, the rate of assaults upon police continues to
climb yearly, with higher rates than the average in the larger cities.2c
Revolvers and automatic pistols were used in 131 of the killings of
police officers and knives in two of the cases. 04 These statistics indicate
that there is a real problem of safety for a police officer in stopping and
questioning persons under suspicious circumstances. Frisking for dangerous weapons under appropriate circumstances is one way for the police
to safeguard themselves. Judge Fuld, in his dissenting opinion in People
v. Rivera,6 0 stated that the police should adopt other means to safeguard
themselves while questioning.' 66 In the absence of bulletproof vests and
electronic metal detectors, the next most common method used by the
police to safeguard themselves, when they believe it is dangerous to
approach someone, is to advance with guns drawn and pointed at the
suspect. This is obviously a much more drastic invasion of the individual's
right of privacy and also much more dangerous to his personal safety
than a frisk. However, since a police officer questioning a driver of a car
is necessarily exposed to fire from a weapon held by anyone in the back
seat, police training courses, for cases such as armed robberies, recommend that police approach suspected cars from the rear with guns drawn
and order the persons in the car to get out with their hands up. Most
157.

Id. at 33.

158. Id. at 32-35.
159.

See id. at 35.

160. Ibid.
161.

Id. at 34.

162. Id. at 35.
163.

Ibid.

164. Id. at 34.
165.
166.

14 N.-.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
Id. at 452, 201 N.E.2d at 39, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 468 (di enting opinion).
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courts would hold this to be an immediate arrest and would require probable cause for an arrest at the instant of approach.
What would happen on a motion to suppress evidence in this type
of a case was indicated in a case reported in a New York newspaper. Two
New York City detectives riding past the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel at
-night noticed an old car parked near an entrance of the hotel. As they
passed they saw that the windows of the car were misty as though
someone had been sitting in it for a long time. They also observed four
men in the car who slumped down in their seats as if to hide when the
detectives passed. The detectives approached the car from the rear
with guns drawn and ordered the men out. As they got out a revolver
dropped to the street. The detectives also found a loaded sawed-off shotgun in the car and a can of ether. Three of the men had criminal records,
including one with fifteen previous arrests for crimes including armed
robbery."0 7 The police reported that they admitted that they were waiting
for a wealthy-appearing victim to come out of the hotel so that they could
rob him. The evidence was suppressed upon motion of the defense attorney and the defendants released, since there was no probable cause for
an arrest at the instant of their apprehension. 1 8
The New York State Court of Appeals, in Rivera, has upheld the
power of the police to "stop and frisk" under proper circumstances and
has ruled that every restriction on the liberty of movement of an individual is not necessarily an arrest. The right of investigation under appropriate circumstances has been established under New York law. The
major question still to be resolved is how the Supreme Court of the United
States will rule upon this problem. If the Rivera case or another goes
up on appeal, they may deny certiorari, as they did in Kavanagh v.
Stenhouse.6 9 If they decide to hear the case the Court will "make an
independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the record ... . M70

The State of New York must present sufficient facts to the Court to show
that stopping and frisking under proper circumstances is a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the state. In order to show reasonable
grounds for such detention for investigation, the state must present the
true picture of the conditions that exist in areas of a big city where crimes
of violence are frequent and assaults upon the police are increasing. All of
the facts and circumstances known to the officer upon which he based
his actions must be put in the record so that they may be made known
to the Court. Only thus may the constitutional requirement of probable
cause be established.
167.
168.
169.
170.
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